Category: Money Tips Date: 2007-06-06
There was once a group of pirates, a total of 50, grabbed a large number of treasures ready to allocate. Allocation method is: all of the pirates by 1 to 50 numbers from 1 to begin, who first proposed distribution plan, the rest of the 49 pirates to vote. If the vote that a majority of the pirates agree to this program, according to party with this program; if a majority vote without the consent of a proposal, then the pirates have been thrown into the sea, from Pirates to a proposal, the next one and repeat this process until a program be passed up. In this assumption, these pirates have independent decision-making, and also mental benefits have been the same person, then they will do the distribution of these treasures?
Distribution of these riches, the pirates to consider a proposal, what kind of fellow who would be the case through its own distribution plan, while the vote of the pirates, especially the number of the most front of the pirates not only to consider whether they should agree to be voting program, also consider if the program does not pass, then a proposal, the pirates will be thrown into the sea, but he will be the next person who mentioned the program.
Since all of the pirates are independent decision-making, and is the same intelligence-interested persons. Thus, when a proposal after the Pirates No. 1, 2, pirates will think, if the self does not agree with this proposal, then the No. 3 Pirates will not agree, and so all the pirates would not agree with, thus their own will be the next one a proposal, people.
Because all of the same intellectual pirates, the pirates will not make it 2 a better solution, then the No. 2 will also work with the same No. 1, were thrown into the sea, so the pirates could only agree on the 2nd program No. 1. No. 3, Viking 2, must be aware of the consent, and if they do not agree to that behind all the pirates will also not agree with this reasoning, they would be able to escape as the No. 1 and 2, the same as the fate of being thrown into the sea, . Because of this process will be iterative, so no matter what program will have a majority of Viking 1, Viking agreed to the proposal. Therefore, the end result is that at least half of the pirates agree, on the 1st take away all the treasure the pirates.
Such an outcome is unexpected. The main reason is that on the pirates of the three assumptions: independent decision-making, intelligence, and Lee has been the same person. Comparisons with the present stock market, even though the individual concerned, to determine the ability of investors may not be the same, but three assumptions of the institutional investors is quite appropriate.
Has there been relatively large number of institutional investors with a way to manipulate stock prices to attract retail investors to follow suit, cheap to buy, sell high. This operation mode is based on so-called "Greater Fool" on the basis of, and the "Greater Fool" theory argued that, due to differences in information and financial strength, a number of institutional investors can earn money from other investors. However, the diving Zhuanggu proof way of manipulating stock prices is a failure. At the institutional era, investors in the acquisition and processing of information is not much difference, capital is a double-edged sword, when the benefit to buy and sell when the negative. Therefore, the "Greater Fool" theory-based practice is incompatible with the market situation, then built on the basis of this theory of investment, of course will not escape its fate of the.
In the sector-driven market, you can assume that all institutional investors are independent decision-making, intelligence has been the same Lee who, in other words, all investors are rational. Then the rational investor in the end what kind of features? And rational investors who in turn will make the stock market in a way what date? Below, and then analyzed in detail.
